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Abstract—This paper describes in detail our Security-Critical
Program Analyser (SCPA). SCPA is used to assess the security of
a given program based on its design or source code with regard
to data flow-based metrics. Furthermore, it allows software devel-
opers to generate a UML-like class diagram of their program and
annotate its confidential classes, methods and attributes. SCPA
is also capable of producing Java source code for the generated
design of a given program. This source code can then be compiled
and the resulting Java bytecode program can be used by the tool
to assess the program’s overall security based on our security
metrics.
Index Terms—Object-Orientation, Software Security, Security
Metrics, Security Analyser, Information Flow.
I. INTRODUCTION
Most existing security analysis tools aim to assess a pro-
gram’s security with regard to the existence of previously
defined coding vulnerabilities. These tools search for source
code bugs to analyse the security of a given program. Ex-
amples of such tools include FindBugs [1] [2], PMD [3] and
Checkstyle [4] which are designed to identify any potential
vulnerabilities in Java programs. In fact, most tools developed
for this purpose concentrate on finding vulnerabilities in non
object-oriented programs such as programs developed in C.
An example of these tools is MOPS [5] developed by Chen
and Wagner, which is a model checking security program
to identify source code bugs such as abuses of setuid
bugs. However, both of these types of tools cannot quantify
the security of security-critical programs. A more useful tool
would be one which measures the overall security of a given
program.
Those tools which quantify a program’s quality are, in
most cases, not security oriented. In other words, they do not
consider security to be part of the overall program’s quality
and therefore they do not measure the security level of a given
program. Some examples of these tools are: OOMeter [6]
which measures program quality based on UML designs;
JHawks [7], JMetric [8], Metrics [9] and *J [10] which extract
a number of static quality metrics from source code; and
DynaMetrics [11] which uses existing object-oriented quality
metrics to dynamically analyse and evaluate the quality of Java
programs.
Other tools such as Fujaba [12] [13], UMLet [14], UML-
Graph [15] [16] and ArgoUML [17] enable developers to
design programs using UML diagrams. Fujaba is further
capable of generating Java source code from a given UML
design [12] [13]. However, none of these tools are security-
oriented and hence do not annotate confidential data or assess
the security of a given design. Therefore, a tool that is capable
of quantifying the overall security of a program at various
stages during its development is needed.
This paper describes our Security-Critical Program Analyser
(SCPA) which allows software developers to design and assess
the overall security of their security-critical programs easily.
SCPA allows developers to create designs, annotate confi-
dential data (i.e., classes, methods and attributes) and define
interactions between methods and attributes. Such designs can
then be analysed to extract our object-oriented security design
metrics [18] [19]. From such a design, Java source code and
Java bytecode can be produced. The resulting Java bytecode
can be analysed to extract our security metrics [20] for object-
oriented programs to give better results about the program’s
overall security.
Software developers can also use SCPA to edit designs of
existing security-critical programs using our security refactor-
ing rules defined previously [21] in order to improve their
security. In this paper, we show in more detail the capabilities
of our tool using a case study consisting of a small security-
critical program.
II. SECURITY-CRITICAL PROGRAM ANALYSER (SCPA)
ARCHITECTURE
This section describes our tool’s architecture for designing
security-critical programs, generating Java source code for
an existing security-critical design, and assessing the security
with regard to our design and code level metrics [18] [19] [20].
SCPA consists of sixteen different classes, more than thirteen
thousand of lines of code and four different sub-tools. These
are meant to achieve the main goal of SCPA, which is to
automatically assess the overall security of security-critical
designs and programs in an easy way. SCPA’s sub-tools
include: a UML Design Security Analyser (UMLDSA), a Java
Source Code Generator (JSCG), an External Java Compiler
and a Java Bytecode Security Analyser (JBSA). Figure 1
shows the sub-tools which are part of SCPA and their outputs,
which are described in more detail below.
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Fig. 1: Security-Critical Program Analyser (SCPA) Architec-
ture
A. UML Design Security Analyser (UMLDSA)
This part of the tool is responsible for providing pro-
grammers with two important features for designing security-
critical programs as shown in Figure 2. One feature is the
ability to generate annotated UML-like class diagrams with
UMLsec and SPARK’s annotations added by the designer.
UMLsec’s annotations identify confidential data [22] while
SPARK’s annotations express the information flow relations
between the methods and attributes of a given class [23], which
are normally not shown in class designs. The second feature
is the ability to evaluate the security of these diagrams with
regard to our security design metrics.
Generating a UML Security-Critical Class Diagram: As
shown in Figure 2, this part of the tool allows the designer
to produce the UML-like security-critical class diagram. This
process involves four major steps:
1) Storing the class signature and relations. The class
signature defines whether the class is critical (i.e. con-
tains classified attributes), extensible (i.e. not final), a
superclass or subclass. The signature also defines the
class’ accessibility (e.g., public or private). This step also
involves storing the relations of this class with others
in the design. This includes inheritance, association and
composition relations. (We are aware that there are other
types of relations between classes but these are the only
ones required by our security metrics.)
2) Storing the class attributes and their details. This in-
cludes storing the name of the attribute, type and acces-
sibility in addition to whether the attribute is classified,
static and/or final.
3) Storing the class methods and their details. The details
required for each method are: the method signature
which includes name, type, accessibility, parameters,
extensibility, and if it is static; whether the method is
classified, and the attributes which the method interacts
with and how it interacts with them (i.e., setting and/or
reading their values).
4) Storing the Java libraries required by the design. This
step is not necessary for assessing the security of a
UML class diagram, but is required when converting
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Fig. 2: UML Design Security Analyser (UMLDSA)
the design to Java source code.
When all of the information for a class has been entered
by the designer, the class information is saved and the class
is added to the diagram in the UMLDSA display area. An
existing class in the design can be edited. Attributes and
methods can be added, deleted or changed using the same
interface for class entry (see Figure 3). A class can also be
deleted from the design using the interface in Figure 4. A UML
design may be saved to a text file. The tool can also import
designs from text files. The interface for these operations are
shown in Figure 5.
Assessing a UML Security-Critical Class Diagram:
Once a design has been created or loaded, it can be as-
sessed according to our security design metrics, described
elsewhere [18] [19]. The analysis is carried out as follows:
1) The attributes of a class are added to sets for: classified
attributes (i.e. labelled “secrecy”), non private static
classified attributes, non private instance classified at-
tributes, classified attributes which can be inherited (i.e.,
classified attributes in a critical superclass) and classified
attributes in an inheritance hierarchy (i.e., classified
attributes in a critical superclass or critical subclass).
2) The methods of a class are divided into sets of: clas-
sified methods (labelled “secrecy”), non private classi-
fied methods, extensible classified methods, classified
methods which can be inherited (i.e., classified methods
in a critical superclass) and classified methods in an
inheritance hierarchy (i.e., classified methods in a critical
superclass or critical subclass), classified attributes that
are set by mutators and/or read by accessors.
3) The class itself is then added to other sets depending if it
is: critical (i.e., contains classified attributes), extensible,
superclass and subclass.
4) Relationships between classes are also identified and
classes are added to sets depending on which classes are
coupled to other classes and through which attributes,
which critical classes are composed-part private classes,
and which classes are in an inheritance hierarchy.
5) All of these sets are then used to calculate our security
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Fig. 3: New Class Details User Interfaces in UMLDSA
Fig. 4: Deleting a UML Class Interface in UMLDSA
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Fig. 5: Saving and Opening UML Design Interfaces in
UMLDSA
design metrics as follows [18] [19].
• Sets which contain information related to the size
of classified attributes, non private static classified
attributes, non private instance classified attributes,
classified methods and non private classified meth-
ods are used to calculate data encapsulation-based
security metrics.
• Sets which contain information related to the size
of classified attributes, mutated classified attributes,
accessed classified attributes, mutators, accessors,
all methods and all classified methods are used to
calculate cohesion-based security metrics.
• Sets of all classes, critical classes, mutated classi-
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fied attributes and accessed classified attributes in
the design are used to calculate a coupling-based
security metric.
• Sets of all critical classes and composed-part private
critical classes in the design are used to calculate a
composition-based security metric.
• Sets which contain information related to the size
of critical classes, classified methods, extensible
critical classes and extensible classified methods
are used to calculate extensibility-based security
metrics.
• Sets of all classes, critical classes, critical super-
classes, classified methods in inheritance hierar-
chies, inheritable classified methods, classified at-
tributes in inheritance hierarchies, inheritable clas-
sified attributes are used to calculate inheritance-
based security metrics.
• Sets of all classes and critical classes in the design
are used to calculate a design size-based security
metric.
B. Generating Java Source Code (JSCG)
Another main feature of our tool is the ability to generate the
relevant Java source code from UML Security-Critical Class
Diagrams as a basis for calculating code-level metrics. This
generated skeleton code includes those attributes which the
user labelled to be “Classified”. To generate the dummy body
of each method in a given class, the tool analyses the SPARK
annotations generated by the UMLDSA that identify which
Fig. 8: External Java Compiler
attributes are mutated or accessed by the class’ methods.
As shown in Figure 6, this part of the tool is responsible
for creating a Java program based on the output of the UML
Design Security Analyser (UMLDSA). UMLDSA produces a
map that contains all the design’s classes and their attributes,
methods, and imported libraries. JSCG produces the program’s
equivalent Java source code, which can be compiled and
analysed to assess the security of the program at the code
level.
From the design, a number of Java source code files are
created and saved to a specific location (Figure 7). First of
all a file called Marker.java is generated. This Java class
is responsible for producing the annotations used to label
security-critical attributes. Next a new Java file is created for
each class in the design. If a class is nested (inner class) then
it is included in the Java file with its enclosing class. A class
is written to the file as follows:
1) Import statements are written for any libraries that were
identified as being required by the class.
2) The class signature is then written, including the class
name, accessibility and any superclasses.
3) Next each attribute for the class is declared and anno-
tated, including the the attribute name, accessibility, type
and if this is a class or instance attribute.
4) Lastly the methods for each class are declared. The
method signature is written followed by the method
dummy body which shows which attributes that are
mutated or accessed by this method.
C. Java Source Code Compiler
The third feature of our SCPA is to provide developers
with the ability to compile their Java source code programs.
Figure 8 shows the interface for this feature. This is used either
to compile Java code skeletons generated from UML specifi-
cations, for calculating design-level metrics, or for compiling
annotated Java programs, for calculating code-level metrics.
This part of our tool uses an external compiler developed
as a part of the Eclipse Java Development Tools (JDT) [24].
The compiler has been configured to compile annotated Java
programs and integrate these annotations into the compiled
Java bytecode. The tool will display any compilation errors
given by the compiler in the text area shown in Figure 8.
D. The Java Bytecode Security Analyser (JBSA)
The final feature of our tool is the JBSA which can automat-
ically calculate our security code metrics from a Java bytecode
program. The JBSA can be used with bytecode files which
were produced from (1) a program created using our SCPA
tool i.e. a security-critical class diagram created by the user,
and annotated Java source code generated and then compiled
using the tool; (2) an externally created annotated Java source
code program imported into the tool and then compiled using
the tool; or (3) an externally created Java bytecode program
imported into the tool. In case 3, the bytecode must contain
appropriate annotations. In order to start using the Java Byte-
code Security Analyser, the first requirement is to annotate the
Java source code files before compiling them. (Conceptually,
we could avoid the compilation step and begin with a bytecode
program, given a way of identifying the classified attributes it
contains.) The annotation process involves choosing which of
the program’s attributes (fields) need to be kept secret. In other
words, confidential data is required to be annotated by the
programmer/designer as “Classified”. This annotation process
can be done using Java 1.6 which allows markers as shown
in Figure 9, where string ID is marked as classified data. To
interpret the bytecode instructions, we use a plugin tool for
Eclipse from the ASM project called Bytecode Outline [25].
Our tool also uses ASM Java library [25], which is responsible
for parsing Java bytecode classes to help us with our analysis.
Fig. 9: Annotation Example
The program’s designer will have decided which attributes
are classified. These attributes will be annotated as such. One
major feature of the JBSA is that it automatically determines
which unlabelled attributes may derive their values from
classified ones. For instance, if a variable x is labelled as
classified, and the program contains an assignment of the
form ‘y = E (x)’, where E (x) is some expression involving
variable x, then variable y will be considered by the JBSA to
be classified as well. Such a transfer of classified data could
also occur via parameter passing. Another way of identifying
which unlabelled attributes may derive their values from clas-
sified ones is through control-flow analysis. For example, if a
variable x is labelled as classified, and the program contains a
statement of the form ‘if (x == 1) then y = 0;’, then assigned
variable y will be considered by the tool to be classified since
its value depends on that of x which is itself classified.
III. SCPA CASE STUDY
Having seen how the JBSA does its calculations, the fol-
lowing case study illustrates how our tool can be used in
practice to assess a specific security-critical program with
regard to our security design and code metrics during the
software development process. The case study shows how
design and code metrics may change when a number of
standard refactoring rules are applied to the original program.
In order to accurately allow the UMLDSA to apply the
security design metrics on a given design, a complete an-
notated UML class diagram of that design is required. The
class diagram must include UMLsec and SPARK’s annotations
in addition to the standard elements of a class diagram. We
use our SCPA tool to design two versions of a specific
security-critical program such that the second design is a
refactored version of the first one using a number of standard
refactoring rules which aim to improve security as described
previously [21]. We also use the SCPA tool to convert both
of these designs to their equivalent Java source code so the
JBSA can assess the security of these program based on our
security code metrics.
A. Original Annotated Design
Figure 10 shows a screen shot of an annotated class diagram
designed using our UMLDSA for a planned computer program
for storing records of legal cases. It consists of several classes
responsible for storing details about a judge, client, court and
case. The Judge class is responsible for storing a judge’s
information. This includes the judge’s level and title, which are
always used together to identify a certain judge. We assume
those attributes are confidential data, and hence need to be
kept secret. The Court class contains information related to
a certain court, which consists of the court’s name and judges
belonging to it. The judges at a certain court are assumed to
be security-critical, and therefore they are labelled classified
(i.e., “secrecy” in UMLsec).
The Client class is responsible for storing information
about clients’ names and their IDs, and we assume that
a client’s ID holds confidential data and thus needs to be
protected. A client can be either a person or company. In the
case that the client is a person, then their national identity
number represents their ID in the Client class which is
security-critical information. However, when the client is a
company then their business number represents their ID, which
is not security-critical data. However, the Client class does
not distinguish the difference between these two types of IDs.
This means that the ID might hold classified information when
it belongs to a person and therefore this attribute has be to
annotated classified and kept secret. The main class of this
program is the Case class which stores information about a
given case’s type, court and client, which are security-critical
data.
B. Refactored Design
Figure 11 shows a screen shot of a refactored version of
the original design using a number of standard refactoring
rules [26]. The refactoring rules used to get this version
aim to make the original program’s design clearer and more
maintainable. Furthermore, they can improve the design’s
overall security as shown elsewhere [21], in this instance by
separating classified and non-classified attributes into different
classes. This version was designed using UMLDSA and then
converted to Java source code using JSCG in order to show
how the tool assesses each program differently with regard to
our security metrics.
The class diagram in Figure 11 differs from the original
design in the number of classes, which is now six instead
of four. This was done to improve the extendibility and
effectiveness of the program [27], and uses the refactoring
rules of Extract Superclass to extract a non-critical superclass
(Client) and Extract Subclass to extract a critical subclass
(Person) and a non-critical subclass (Company). The shared
non-classified attribute (name) and non-classified methods
(SetName and GetName) for both of the new subclasses
were pulled up to their non-critical superclass using the Pull
Fig. 10: Original Legal Case Class Diagram
Fig. 11: Refactored Legal Case Class Diagram
Up Field and Pull Up Method refactoring rules. The fields
and methods of these two new subclasses were pushed down
to their relevant subclass using the Push Down Field and Push
Down Method.
The critical Judge class in this design is composed-part to
the Court class and its accessibility is marked as private.
This was done using the refactoring rule Extract Composed-
Part Class. The Judge class now has fewer classified at-
tributes and methods. This was done using the Inline Field
and Inline Method rules to combine the level and title
attributes into one attribute ID and combine SetLevel and
SetTitle methods into one classified method i.e., SetID.
This was done since these attributes and methods were always
used together to identify a certain judge.
This new design also differs from the original as the
accessibility of its attributes has been changed to be private
using refactoring rule Encapsulate Field except for the name
attribute whose accessibility was changed to be protected
since it is used by the subclasses Person and Company.
Refactoring rule Hide Method was also used to change the
accessibility of SetJudgeID and GetJudgeID methods in
the Court class since they are only used within their class.
C. Security Design-Metrics Results
The two tables on the right in Figures 10 and 11 show the
security design metrics results produced by our UMLDSA.
They show the design’s security characteristics (i.e., absolute
metrics) for the analysed designs and their annotated security-
critical attributes, methods, and classes. They reveal that
Design 2 has more methods and classes than Design 1, but
fewer classified attributes and methods.
They also show our security design metrics calculated based
on the two designs. The results of these metrics show that all
values of Design 2 are lower than those in Design 1. This,
in fact, reflects the general characteristics of these designs in
which the absolute number of classified attributes and methods
are lower for Design 2 than those for Design 1.
Given that lower values of each metric are considered more
secure, this means that Design 2 is the most secure design of
the two, as expected.
D. Security Code Metrics Results
Our security code metrics measure security based on a given
object-oriented program’s executable code (Java bytecode in
our case) with respect to the (potential) flow of ‘classified’
data.
The two tables on the right in Figures 12 and 13 show the
security code metrics results produced by our JBSA based
on the executable code generated for the two designs. The
tables reveal that the characteristics of these two programs
are similar to the the ones produced by the UMLDSA with
regard to their designs. They differ in the number of methods
and classified methods because bytecode classes have default
constructors for each class, each of which is counted as a
method. The increase in the number of classified methods in
Program 1 compared to its design (Design 1) is caused by
methods SetCourtName and SetClientName. Although
these methods have not been annotated as ‘classified’, JBSA
marks them ‘classified’ since they interact with an object that
has been labelled as ‘classified’. This is similar to the increase
in the number of classified methods in Program 2, in which
SetCourtName is marked ‘classified’ since it interacts with
a classified object (i.e., court).
The other difference between the results of the program and
design level absolute metrics is the number of attributes in
Program 2 when compared to its design. While the number
of attributes shown in the results of Program 2 is 10, its
design result says that Design 2 has 9 attributes. The cause
of this difference is that compilers by default generate an
attribute that represents a composed-part class in its composed-
whole class when these classes are compiled. Since Program 2
has one composed-part class (i.e., Judge), an object called
Court$judge is generated by default in the compiled
Court class. In general, it can be seen that Program 2 has
more methods and classes than Program 1, but fewer classified
attributes and methods, which is a similar case to the designs
of these programs.
With regard to the results of our security code metrics
shown, it is obvious that all results of these metrics have either
stayed the same or decreased in going from Program 1 to
Program 2, except for two metrics (UCAM and UCAC) which
have slightly increased. This indicates that Program 2 is more
secure than Program 1, which is what we would expect based
on the design level results.
In summary, the tool-supported implementation of our se-
curity code metrics have shown hidden attributes and methods
which cannot be seen at the design level. These include the
default generated constructors for each class and the default
generated attribute for each composed class. While security
design metrics can measure security in an easy way, security
code metrics can give more accurate results.
E. Security Metrics Analysis
Our JBSA can produce hierarchical security metrics as
defined previously [20], which present four different levels for
interpreting the results of our security code metrics as shown
in Figures 12 and 13. One way is by showing the security
data flow metrics which as on the right in Figures 12 and 13.
Another way is by showing the readability and writability
metrics level. This can tell us which of the programs is more
secure in terms of readability and writability of security-
critical data. Figures 12 and 13 show these metrics and indicate
that Program 2 is more secure than Program 1 in this regard.
This means that Program 2 reads and writes fewer classified
attributes and methods, and critical classes than Program 1.
Another way of interpreting the results of our metrics is to
choose which program satisfies the requirements of specific
design principles. This is the third level of our hierarchical
security metrics [20]. The radar charts in Figures 12 and 13
show the values of each of these programs with regard to
seven different security design principles. Lower values, i.e.,
Fig. 12: Original Legal Case Security Code Metrics
Fig. 13: Refactored Legal Case Security Code Metrics
those closer to the centre, are better so we can easily see that
Program 2 is the most secure program in this regard.
The easiest way of identifying the most secure program is
by comparing a single Total Security Index (TSI) for each of
the programs [20]. The TSI values for these programs, which
is produced by our JBSA, also confirms our judgement that
Program 2 is the more secure program. Given that lower values
of TSI are considered more secure, our JBSA shows that the
TSI value for Program 1 is 74.655 while the TSI value for
Program 2 is 53.301.
The other way of interpreting the results of these metrics
is to identify how the chosen refactoring rules have affected
security. To convert the first design into the second, we used
a number of standard refactoring rules which were shown
previously [21] to improve security. The results produced for
both of the final programs confirm that the chosen refactoring
rules improved security when Design 1 has been refactored
using these rules to Design 2.
IV. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we have shown how our Security-Critical
Program Analyser (SCPA) automatically assesses the overall
security of security-critical designs and programs. Our tool
allows developers to generate an annotated UML-like design
for their security-critical programs and quantify its overall
security with regard to our security design metrics. We have
also shown how our tool generates Java source code for an
existing security-critical design. This can be also compiled
using our tool, in which case the SCPA uses an external
compiler, to generate its Java bytecode program. In order
to produce better results for executable code, SCPA assesses
the security of a given program with regard to our security
program metrics based on its annotated bytecode classes.
A possible direction for future work inspired by this work
is concerned with extending the SCPA to provide an auto-
mated refactoring process for security-critical programs. Such
a tool would be similar to the one developed by Sison et
al. [28], which is an Eclipse plug-in that automatically makes
recommendations for software refactorings by examining the
structure of the program’s abstract syntax tree (AST). In our
case, we could extend our tool to study the program’s abstract
syntax tree (AST) and information flow of classified data in
order to make recommendations for secure refactoring steps
that guarantee to produce more secure programs.
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